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Indian nukes may lead to stability: US expert

Aziz Haniffa
India Abroad Correspondent in Washington

India's evolving nuclear doctrine is likely to be conducive to, rather than subversive of, strategic stability in South Asia, according to a leading American strategic affairs expert who works for a think-tank affiliated with the Pentagon.

Ashley Tellis, senior policy analyst at the Rand Corporation -- considered the Pentagon's own think-tank -- and professor of policy analysis at the Rand Graduate School, has argued in a paper that "since India believes that its nuclear weapons are useful primarily for deterrence and secondarily for retribution -- in case deterrence fails -- New Delhi can size its nuclear force accordingly."

In his paper prepared for the National Bureau of Asian Research in Seattle, Washington, which is partially funded by Congress, Tellis makes the point that India's nuclear doctrine "therefore provides some assurance that its nuclear arsenal will ultimately consist of a 'minimum' deterrent rather than something more expansive."

"But despite the claims of many Indian analysts to the contrary," he notes, "India's nuclear doctrine does not represent a new or particularly unique contribution to the theory of nuclear deterrence."

Tellis acknowledges that "India's deterrent posture, as exemplified by the notion of the force-in-being with its separated weapon components, centralized but devolving control, and strict civilian supremacy over its core strategic assets, does represent a unique approach to maintaining a nuclear arsenal."

But he reiterates that the "doctrine that regulates the development, deployment, and use of these capabilities is not particularly exceptional because it exemplifies what the nuclear revolution would demand of any state that was status quo in geopolitical orientation and relatively secure as far as its basic geostrategic circumstances are concerned".

Tellis declares that from America's perspective, the "best news about India's emerging nuclear doctrine is that it might dampen rather than accelerate strategic competition in South Asia".

He notes that "as far as the competition between China and India is concerned, both states have more or less strong commitments to no-first-use policies; both states routinely maintain their nuclear capabilities at relatively low levels of readiness; and, most important of all, both states are doctrinally committed to using their nuclear weapons primarily as instruments of retribution in case of deterrence breakdown rather than as tools of defence and war-fighting in pursuit of operational advantage."

In addition, Tellis points out that "neither side currently possesses the technical capabilities to use its nuclear weapons as war-fighting instruments in any but the most primitive ways".

In the context of India and Pakistan, he acknowledges that it is not so simple, "but nonetheless offers hope for continued stability".

Tellis explains that the "Indo-Pakistani rivalry involves dynamic security competition entailing a high degree of routine violence that is manifested through the active struggle over the disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir".

"Pakistan is also a weak state that is highly concerned about Indian threats to its security," he adds. "Nonetheless, the prospect that India will pursue any military option that places Pakistan in a situation where it has no alternative but to use its nuclear weapons in anger is unlikely."

Tellis points out as an example that "India has made deliberate policy decisions not to expand the counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir to include cross-border operations of any kind, and instead has restricted the employment of security forces for military operations within Indian territory."

"Moreover," he argues, "it is increasingly believed that even in the context of a limited conventional war with Islamabad, a nuclear-armed Pakistan would be unlikely to use its nuclear weaponry against India. Islamabad's nuclear arsenal is also not maintained routinely at hair-trigger, or even high levels of readiness."

"And if Pakistan were to consider using its nuclear weapons against India," Tellis warns, "the stark geographic vulnerabilities of Pakistan imply that even a relatively small Indian residual reserve would more than suffice to destroy Pakistan as a functioning state."

On balance, therefore, "the precarious equilibrium currently prevailing in South Asia is likely to continue for some time to come. Many factors, like the conventional and nuclear balances between India, Pakistan, and China, the political objectives pursued by these entities vis-a-vis one another, and the non-proliferation pressures emanating from the international community, contribute to the extant political rivalries being kept with certain defined bounds."

He predicts that "the conservative character of India's emerging nuclear doctrine -- if perceived as such in Pakistan -- could enhance the prospects for future stability greatly because, among other things, it coincides [roughly] with Beijing's owns beliefs about the value of nuclear weaponry, even as it seeks to avoid providing Islamabad with the excuses necessary to drive a race for counterforce pre-eminence in the subcontinent".

Thus, Tellis declares that in a region where "political instability appears to be an endemic fact of life, even such a modest contribution could, if properly appreciated, be good news".

In his preamble, Tellis says it's about time the international community accepts the fact that India is a nuclear weapons state and acknowledges the credibility of New Delhi's arguments that it requires a nuclear deterrent "against its main nuclear rival, China, or against an unstable nuclear-capable Pakistan, which maintains close ties with China".

The paper by Tellis, who told India Abroad that he did this paper for NBAR "because they wanted me to address the stability question in the region", is significant in the development of the Bush administration's policy because it knocks down the contention by the nuclear non-proliferation hawks in the State Department who believe that India's claim that it requires a nuclear deterrent adds to instability in the region and is likely to set off an arms race.

These hawks have also argued against lifting the sanctions against India.

But going by Tellis's paper, obviously the thinking in the Pentagon is in stark contrast and lends credence to what senior administration officials told India Abroad when Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld met External Affairs and Defence Minister Jaswant Singh on April 6 -- that he [Rumsfeld] has no qualms about the US lifting all the remaining sanctions against India so that New Delhi and Washington can enter into a strategic relationship.

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